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THE “IDEAL DEBTOR” AND THE “TRADITIONAL”
AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD
A. Mechele Dickerson*
ABSTRACT
Laws that award governmental benefits reflect an archetype of the type of
person deemed worthy of governmental assistance and generally favor and
reward people who have specific personal attributes or who engage in activities
deemed socially desirable. Just as the Bankruptcy Code favors the “Ideal
Debtor,” state and federal laws favor and subsidize Americans who live in a
“traditional household.” Historically, this household consisted of husbands who
earned income in the paid labor market and wives who stayed home to provide
unpaid care for their husbands and minor children. Households that deviated
from that norm rarely received the full range of benefits and often were excluded
from receiving the financial subsidies traditional households receive. Changes
in social mores, the legalization of same-sex marriages, bans on gender
discrimination in employment markets, and widening economic inequality have
made it more likely that households will consist of a multi-generational family,
single parents, unmarried partners, childless married couples, and married
parents who both earn income in the paid labor market.
Despite a shrinking number of traditional households, U.S. laws continue to
subsidize the narrow profile of families who are most likely to live in a
traditional household: white, rich, college graduates. Even if public policy
historically justified providing subsidies for traditional households, ongoing
subsidies for personal choices (to marry, have children and live in an
independent household) can no longer be justified and, in addition, exacerbate
existing income and wealth disparities.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost 20 years ago, I argued that the members of Congress who envisioned
the type of people most worthy of debt relief in bankruptcy “either consciously
or unconsciously exhibited a bias in favor of a specific demographic profile”
which I labeled the “Ideal Debtor.”1 To receive the full benefits provided by
federal bankruptcy laws, the Ideal Debtor needs savings or stable income to pay
bankruptcy filing and legal fees, should be married (to take advantage of filing
a joint petition and exempting tenants by the entirety property), and should be a
homeowner (to shield property from creditors using state homestead laws). The
Ideal Debtor also should have ERISA-qualified retirement funds or be the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust (since neither creditors nor the bankruptcy
estate can seize those funds), should have few nondischargeable debts (like
student loans) and should only pay expenses for legal dependents, not other
family members.
Because Black debtors generally do not fit that demographic profile, I
concluded that the Ideal Debtor is white.2 Blacks typically will not fully benefit
from the debt relief provided by federal bankruptcy laws because they have

1
2

A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1726 (2004).
Id.
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lower overall income3 and wealth4 but higher unemployment rates. These factors
make it more likely that they will file for relief under chapter 13, which takes
longer and is more expensive, because they may lack the funds to pay a
bankruptcy lawyer a one-time lump sum fee to receive a shorter and cheaper
chapter 7 discharge. Likewise, because they are more likely to have unstable
employment and income it will be harder for them to successfully complete a
multi-year chapter 13 repayment plan.5
Similarly, Blacks are less likely to have the expense, asset or debt mix to
fully benefit from federal debt relief because they have lower marriage and
homeownership rates and are more likely to provide financial support for nondependents, including parents and other family members.6 In addition, they have
disproportionately higher overall student loan debt, hold smaller amounts in
employer-provided retirement plans and rarely are the beneficiaries of
spendthrift trusts.7 Having identified the profile of the “Ideal Debtor,” the Article
concluded by urging Congress to reconsider who they deemed worthy of
bankruptcy relief and to revise the Code to ensure that federal bankruptcy relief
did not inadvertently favor (or discriminate against) any racial group.8
The overall financial predicament Blacks face has changed little over the last
20 years. In fact, their financial circumstances may now be worse given the
income and wealth inequality gaps, particularly between the Top 20% of
households and other poor or middle-income households, that widened during
the 2007-2009 Recession and remain at historic levels. Lower- and middleincome households had barely recovered from their recession losses when the
2020 COVID-19 recession sent unemployment numbers skyrocketing. Although
the richest households quickly rebounded from the 2007 Recession and they
flourished financially during the COVID pandemic, all lower- and middleincome households of all races now face economic precarity.9
3
Generally speaking, income includes revenue streams from wages, salaries, interest on a savings
account, dividends from shares of stock, rent, and the profits an owner makes from selling property. Income
Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2022).
4
Wealth or net worth means the sum total of assets (which includes real estate, cash, stocks and bonds,
and money saved in retirement accounts) minus liabilities (debts, including mortgages, automobile and student
loans, and credit card balances). Id.
5
See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 1742–43, 1752–53.
6
Id. at 1747–48, 1759–61.
7
Id. at 1765–66, 1770.
8
Id. at 1772–75.
9
See Mitchell Barnes et. al., Tax Data Show Evidence of Strong Income Gains for Higher-Income
Families and Only Muted Decreases for Lower- and Moderate-Income Families in 2020, BROOKINGS INST.
(June 17, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/17/tax-data-show-evidence-of-strong-income-
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Progressive legislators and policy institutes regularly focus on ways to close
income and wealth inequality gaps. But little attention has been paid to the ways
state and federal policies award benefits to “traditional” households and, as a
result, exacerbate those gaps. Just as the Code is biased in favor of a particular
debtor profile, the people most likely to benefit from state and federal subsidies
(including those contained in bankruptcy, tax, immigration, and local zoning
laws) live in “traditional” households where a husband earns income in the labor
market and a wife remains home to rear their children. As is true with the Ideal
Debtor, people who live in traditional households fit a narrow demographic
profile: they are rich, they are white, and they have college degrees.10
This Article argues that federal and state laws should neither encourage nor
subsidize a household formation that largely benefits families who least need
economic subsidies. Part I describes the benefits state and federal laws and
policies bestow on “traditional” households and explains the policy justifications
for encouraging families to live in that type of household. Part II explains how:
(1) decades of stagnant income and job insecurity for all but the highest paid
workers; (2) higher female college attendance rates; and (3) the increased
tendency of college graduates to marry each other has resulted in lower marriage
rates, an increase in unmarried cohabitating partner households, and an increase
in the number of “unpartnered” young adults (especially males) who are neither
married nor cohabitating. Economic precarity has had especially stark effects on
marriage rates for low-income males without college degrees as many are now
viewed as “unmarriageable” by potential partners.
Part III explains how the increase in the number of financially vulnerable
young adults has resulted in more single-parent households and childless
households and fewer single-earner married households. Part IV then shows how
financial fragility makes it harder for young adults to form their own households
and buy homes and why so many continue to live at home with their parents.
Now, only higher-income college graduates or those with access to family
wealth can reasonably expect to become homeowners and live independently.
This Article concludes by arguing that local, state, and federal laws and
policies should be household-neutral to ensure that public financial benefits are
not disproportionately bestowed on a shrinking demographic profile. The Article
suggests that if legislators and policymakers continue to deem the “traditional”
gains-for-higher-income-families-and-only-muted-decreases-for-lower-and-moderate-income-families-in2020/; see also Elise Gould & Jori Kandra, Wages Grew in 2020 Because the Bottom Fell Out of the Low-Wage
Labor Market, ECON. POL’Y. INST. 1, 1, 5–9 (Feb. 24, 2021), https://files.epi.org/pdf/219418.pdf.
10
See discussion infra Section III.
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household formation worthy of government subsidies, they must find ways to
make it financially feasible for young people to marry, have children, and
establish independent households.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD

Before the 1970s, the stereotypical American household consisted of a
married man and woman with children who moved out of their parents’ home to
form their own households once they graduated from high school.11 Husbands
in “traditional” households earned income in the paid labor market to support
their wives and children while wives remained in the home to provide care for
their husbands and children.12 This household formation was reasonably
attainable until the 1970s because: (1) male workers (particularly if they were
white) could find stable, high wage jobs that paid them enough to support their
families; and (2) marriage rates were high because gender discrimination in paid
labor markets limited the ability of female workers to earn enough to support
themselves.13
While both state and federal laws encourage and subsidize traditional
households, the status of being married is defined and regulated by state (not
federal) laws. State laws determine how marriages can be formed and
terminated, regulate the property interests of married couples, and impose and
enforce responsibilities on married couples and their children.14 As the United
States Supreme Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage has always
been the gateway to greater legal rights and benefits15 and has been encouraged
and subsidized on both moral and financial grounds.16
11
See Shannon E. Cavanagh & Paula Fomby, Family Instability in the Lives of American Children, 45
ANN. REV. SOCIO. 493, 495–96 (2019).
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See Katharine K. Baker, What is Nonmarriage?, 73 SMU L. REV. 201, 207 (2020) (critiquing postmarital support determinations that are based on marital status rather than individual need).
15
Marriage is the gateway to a range of governmental rights and benefits including laws or norms
governing:

taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the
law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights
and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and
visitation rules.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
16
See Robin L. West, The Incoherence of Marital Benefits, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 179, 181
(2013) (“[T]he contention that children in such families fare better than their peers who lack those advantages is
supported by an abundance of social science.”).
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To encourage people to enter into a status-based relationship that initially
consisted of only one husband and only one wife, both state and federal laws
and policies subsidize people who are married17 based on the assumption that
marriage would be followed by children and that dual-parent households provide
a more financially stable, healthy, and emotionally secure environment to rear
children.18 State and federal laws historically justified marriage subsidies based
on the legislative and judicial view that a traditional husband-wife household is
“the natural or optimal environment in which to raise children”19 and that nonmarital sexual relationships were morally offensive and undermined and
debased the institution of marriage.20
To discourage non-marital cohabitation, state laws historically refused to
grant unmarried couples (whether opposite or same sex) the same legal rights
and benefits that husbands and wives received, since cohabitating partners
ostensibly could receive those benefits (at least if they were opposite-sex) by
marrying each other.21 For example, while ex-wives could receive alimony from
their husbands after a divorce, women who left non-marital relationships had
limited rights to financial support from their male partners22 and same sex
cohabitants generally had no legal right to support from their ex-partners until
Obergefell v. Hodges legalized their marriages.
In addition to discouraging unmarried cohabitation, state laws encouraged
parents to marry and form traditional households by stigmatizing and penalizing
mothers who had children outside of marriage.23 To encourage women to marry
17
A report prepared by the Government Accounting Office identified 1,138 provisions in the United
States Code where marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges. U.S.
GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1
(2004), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-04-353r.
18
See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, The Integrity of Marriage, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 453, 472 (2019);
Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 307, 308–09, 325
(2004).
19
Matsumura, supra note 18, at 482; see West, supra note 16 (“If you have a child and don’t marry the
child’s father, then you have done something grossly irresponsible, so don’t turn to the government for
assistance.”).
20
See A. Mechele Dickerson, “Family Values” and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate
Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded Based on Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 73, 84 (1998).
21
See Baker, supra note 14 (critiquing post-marital support determinations that are based on marital status
rather than individual need).
22
See id.
23
Andrew Cherlin et al., Promises They Can Keep: Low-Income Attitudes Toward Motherhood, 70(4) J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 919, 920 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2008.00536.x (“Until the last third of
the twentieth century, a strong norm against having a first child prior to marrying existed. Even if a woman
became pregnant before marrying, she and her partner often married whether they had planned to or not – in the
latter case, submitting to a so-called shotgun wedding.”); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 343–55 (1996)
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the fathers of their children and to demonize single mothers who refused to be
married, state and federal public assistance programs made it harder for single
mothers to receive assistance from government programs, essentially deeming
those programs to be appropriate only for “worthy” mothers with young
children.24
There has always been a tension in this country between economic
conservatives who think the unmarried mothers of young children should earn
income in the paid labor market in exchange for receiving financial assistance
from the government, and social conservatives who think a mother’s role is to
remain at home with their children.25 Which single mothers should be ostracized
and forced to work in return for governmental assistance, and which should be
encouraged to remain home to rear their children, has always been colored by
race as single Black mothers consistently have been vilified and deemed
unworthy “welfare queens” who should not be allowed to remain home, rear
their children, and avoid the paid labor market.26
To discourage non-marital sexual relationships and to encourage mothers to
marry the fathers of their children, state and federal legislators enacted laws to
“reduce single mothers’ dependence upon government” and encourage their
“dependency upon a husband wage earner in a traditional marriage.”27 For
example, when Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWO) and revised existing social welfare programs,
legislators implemented work requirements which required states to demonstrate
they would use federal funds to promote “healthy marriage . . . activities and
activities promoting responsible fatherhood.”28 Legislation like this essentially
deemed unmarried mothers, who ostensibly could support their children by
24
McClain, supra note 23, at 351–55; Gillian Brockell, She Was Stereotyped As ‘The Welfare Queen.’
The Truth Was More Disturbing, A New Book Says, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/history/2019/05/21/she-was-stereotyped-welfare-queen-truth-was-more-disturbing-new-book-says/; see Richard
V. Reeves & Christopher Pulliam, Middle Class Marriage is Declining, and Likely Deeping Inequality, BROOKINGS
INST. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/middle-class-marriage-is-declining-and-likely-deepeninginequality/.
25
McClain, supra note 23, at 353–55.
26
Id.; Emily Badger & Claire Cain Miller, A New Benefit Raises an Old Question: Which Mothers Should
Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/upshot/mothers-child-allowancebiden.html (updated June 25, 2021); see Brockell, supra note 24. The Moynihan Report found that Black singlemother household rates increased from 16.8% in 1940 to 23% in 1965 and suggests that this increase was
destroying the Black community. The Moynihan Report, infra note 53, at 5, 9. Though the Moynihan Report
notes that rates were also increasing for white mothers (from 2% in 1940 to slightly over 3% in 1965), Black
mothers were the only ones vilified in the report. Id.
27
West, supra note 16, at 182.
28
42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2018); see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §101(3), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (1996).
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changing their marital status from single to married, as unworthy of the legal
rights and protections married mothers received.29
While federal laws do not determine how marriages can be formed, both
state and federal laws and policies favor married parents who live in traditional
households. For example, as I noted when describing the Ideal Debtor,
bankruptcy laws allow married couples to reduce their filing fees and legal
expenses by filing a joint bankruptcy petition.30 Bankruptcy laws also let married
debtors: (1) protect certain property a “dependent” spouse owns even if the
spouse is not actually financially dependent on the debtor; (2) include some of
their spouse’s expenses when calculating how much money they must use to
repay debts in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case; and (3) shield property held as
tenants by the entirety from their creditors.31
Outside of bankruptcy, older widowed (and some divorced) adults can
receive enhanced Social Security, workers’ compensation, or disability
payments based on their current or prior marital status. In contrast, nevermarried adults who no longer earn income but may also need financial assistance
when they retire are not entitled to receive this financial enhancement.32 Federal
tax law also favors and provides significant financial benefits for traditional
households as only married couples can lower their taxes by filing a joint tax
return and receive a “marriage bonus” if one spouse earns most (or all) of the
income.33 Single taxpayers do not receive these benefits and married couples
that involve partners with roughly equal earnings are hit with a “marriage
penalty” that requires them to pay higher taxes than married couples with a stayat-home spouse.34 Married couples also are allowed to: (1) gift (or bequeath)
some of their wealth (including retirement wealth) to their spouse in reduced tax

29
West, supra note 16, at 185 (characterizing as “anachronistic and voyeuristic at best and sadistic, rather
than functional, at worst” the laws’ “stigmatization of unwed mothers; and the refusal, beginning in the mid1990s, to extend the full advantage of state and federal benefits to single parents”).
30
Dickerson, supra note 1; e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018) (“A joint case under a chapter of this title . . .
is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a single petition under such chapter by an individual
that may be a debtor under such chapter and such individual’s spouse.”).
31
Dickerson, supra note 20, at 93–94 (discussing procedure spouses can use to keep entirety property
from creditors).
32
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.336 (outlining how a divorced spouse can collect widow’s benefits if their exspouse dies). Widowed spouses may be entitled to other social welfare benefits if their spouse’s employer
provides benefits to the widowed spouses of their deceased employees. See Baker, supra note 14, at 210–11.
33
See Dickerson, supra note 20, at 88 & nn.99–101; see Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 35–39 (2018).
34
Linda Sugin, The Social Meaning of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 128 YALE L.J. F. 403, 407 (2018);
DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK
AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 5, 9–10, 53 (2021).
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or largely tax-free transactions; (2) make larger contributions to Individual
Retirement Accounts than unmarried couples can; and (3) receive favorable
privileges in immigration decisions.35
II. THE NEW “TRADITIONAL” UNMARRIED HOUSEHOLD
A 2020 article in The Atlantic makes the following observation about the
changes over the last century in the structure of households in America:
We’ve made life freer for individuals and more unstable for
families . . . . We’ve moved from big, interconnected, and extended
families, which helped protect the most vulnerable people in society
from the shocks of life, to . . . families . . . [that] give the most
privileged people in society room to maximize their talents and expand
their options. The shift . . . ultimately led to a familial system that
liberates the rich and ravages the working-class and the poor.36

Though the Atlantic article broadly examined changes in family structure over
the last century, the following sections explore similar changes to household
formations since 1980.
A. Fewer Married Couples and More Unmarried Cohabitants
Because of changing social mores and norms about marriage, non-marital
sex, cohabitation, and single-parent households, people who live in nontraditional households now face less moral condemnation than they did
historically.37 For example, state and federal laws and policies no longer deem
non-marital sexual relationships to be morally offensive and the children of
single mothers are no longer denied the right to receive financial support from
their fathers.38 Likewise, same-sex marriages are now legal and generally
accepted by most people in this country.39
People of all income groups, educational levels, and races still aspire to
marry and they do not believe their marriages will end in divorce. However,
35

Dickerson, supra note 20, at 88 & nn.99–101; see Aloni, supra note 33.
David Brooks, The Nuclear Family Was a Mistake, THE ATL., Mar. 2020, at 55, 56 (available at https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/03/the-nuclear-family-was-a-mistake/605536/).
37
Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 496; see Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of
Unmarried Parents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/04/25/
the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/.
38
Dickerson, supra note 20, at 84 (discussing ways states denigrated non-marital cohabitation to protect
the state of marriage).
39
Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/factsheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
36
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women generally reject the antiquated belief that their lives will be unfulfilled if
they do not marry, reproduce, and remain home to rear their children40 and most
young adults now reject the view that being married is essential for a man or a
woman to live a fulfilling life.41 Although young adults generally are not antimarriage, fewer people believe that society is necessarily better off if people
prioritize marriage and having children.42
Despite generally positive views toward marriage and high marital
expectations and aspirations,43 there has been a “deinstitutionalization of
marriage”44 and marriage rates have dropped across racial and income groups.45
The Pew Research Center, which examines marriage rates and household
formations, reports that only 44% of Millennials (born from 1981-1996 and
between the ages of 26 and 41 in 2022) were married in 2019 compared to 53%
of Gen Xers, 61% of Boomers, and 81% of the Silent Generation at comparable
ages.46 Marriage rates vary dramatically by race with Asian adults having the
40
Colette Allred, High School Seniors’ Attitudes Toward Cohabitation as a Testing Ground for
Marriage, 2017, BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIV.: NAT’L CTR. FOR FAM. & MARRIAGE RSCH. (2019) (available
at https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-and-sciences/NCFMR/documents/FP/allred-hs-seniorscohab-test-marriag-fp-19-10.pdf). Cf. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (“The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”).
41
Colleen N. Nugent & Jill Daugherty, A Demographic, Attitudinal, and Behavioral Profile of Cohabiting
Adults in the United States, CDC: NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS. 1, 3 (May 31, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nhsr/nhsr111.pdf; Amanda Barroso et al., More Than Half of Americans Say Marriage Is Important But
Not Essential to Leading a Fulfilling Life, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/02/14/more-than-half-of-americans-say-marriage-is-important-but-not-essential-to-leading-afulfilling-life/ (indicating that 54% of Americans believe that “being married is important but not essential for
men and women to live fulfilling lives”).
42
Kim Parker & Renee Stepler, As U.S. Marriage Rate Hovers at 50%, Education Gap in Marital Status
Widens, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/14/as-u-s-marriagerate-hovers-at-50-education-gap-in-marital-status-widens/. But see Kiley Hurst, Rising Share of Americans See
Women Raising Children on Their Own, Cohabitation as Bad for Society, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/03/11/rising-share-of-americans-see-women-raising-children-ontheir-own-cohabitation-as-bad-for-society/ (noting an increase in the percentage of Americans who are now
more likely than three years ago to say that it is bad for society when single women raise children alone and
unmarried couples live together).
43
Juliana M. Horowitz et al., Public Views of Marriage and Cohabitation, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 6,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/11/06/public-views-of-marriage-and-cohabitation/.
44
Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11.
45
See Amanda Barroso et al., As Millennials Near 40, They’re Approaching Family Life Differently Than
Previous Generations, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/05/
27/as-millennials-near-40-theyre-approaching-family-life-differently-than-previous-generations/; Benjamin Gurrentz,
Living With an Unmarried Partner Now Common For Young Adults, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/11/cohabitation-is-up-marriage-is-down-for-young-adults.html (in
2018 roughly half of all adults and 30% of young adults were married, whereas in 1978 59% of young adults
were married).
46
Michael Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-
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highest overall marriage rates (58%), followed by whites (51%), Latinos (42%),
and Blacks (29%).47
Just as Black people are less likely to be the Ideal Debtor in bankruptcy, they
are also less likely to live in traditional households mostly because of their
disproportionately low marriage rates.48 Black marriage rates have lagged white
rates since the time enslaved Blacks were denied the right to legally marry. Their
low marriage rates and disproportionately high rates of single-parent households
were chronicled over 50 years ago in The Moynihan Report, a controversial and
highly-publicized congressional report.49 To this day, approximately half of
Black adults (regardless of income or educational levels) are never married
(neither married, divorced, nor widowed) and less than one-quarter (24%) of
Black millennials were married in 2019—half the rate of white Millennial
marriages (48%) and almost half the rate of married Latino millennials (42%).50
In fact, the current Black-white marital rate gap is now larger than the gap in
1968 when the Moynihan Report was issued, though the share of white (27.7%)
and Latino (39.9%) never-married adults has also been rising since the 1980s.51
In addition to these racial disparities, marriage rates now vary, often
substantially, by educational level. From the 1960s and until the early part of the
1990s, there was minimal variation in marriage rates by educational attainment
status and overall marriage rates for all adults over the age of 25 exceeded 55%.52
Although marriage rates have remained fairly constant for college graduates,
65% of young college graduates were married by 2015 compared to 55% of

begins/; Barroso et al., supra note 45.
47
R. Kelly Raley et al., The Growing Racial and Ethnic Divide in U.S. Marriage Patterns, 25 FUTURE
CHILD. 89, 91 tbl.1, 97 tbl.3 (2015); Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; see Fenaba R. Addo & Lowell Ricketts,
As Fewer Young Adults Wed, Married Couples’ Wealth Surpasses Others’, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/in-the-balance/2018/as-fewer-young-adults-wed.
48
See Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; Addo & Ricketts, supra note 47.
49
See OFF. POL’Y PLAN. & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T LAB., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL
ACTION 5 (1965) [hereinafter The Moynihan Report]. The Moynihan Report observed that “[a]t the heart of the
deterioration of the fabric of [Black] society is the deterioration of the [Black] family. It is the fundamental
source of the weakness of the [Black] community at the present time.” Id. The findings in the Moynihan Report
were controversial and critics contended that the authors painted an unduly unflattering image of the Black
family. E.g., Stephen Steinberg, The Moynihan Report at Fifty, BOS. REV. (June 24, 2015), https://bostonreview.
net/articles/stephen-steinberg-moynihan-report-black-families-nathan-glazer/; L. Alex Swan, A Methodological
Critique of the Moynihan Report, BLACK SCHOLAR, June 1974 at 18–24.
50
Raley, supra note 47.
51
Barroso et al., supra note 45; Kim Parker et al., Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW
RSCH. CTR. 11 (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/09/2014-0924_Never-Married-Americans.pdf; Marital Status, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?t=Marital%20Status%20and%20Marital%20History&tid=ACSST5Y2011.S1201.
52
Parker & Stepler, supra note 42.
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those with some college education and only 50% of non-college adults.53 In
addition to having higher marriage rates, college graduates are more likely than
non-college young adults to assume that they will marry and remain married,54
as shown in a 2017 poll that revealed that 20% of never-married non-college
adults do not plan on marrying compared to 11% of other adults.55
In addition to lower overall marriage rates, adults who choose to marry are
now delaying when they marry. Although most Americans believe the ideal age
to marry is 25, only 24% of adults are actually married by that age. The average
age for first marriages for both women and men has steadily increased since the
1960s, when the average age of marriage was 20.3 for women and 22.8 for
men.56 By 1980, the average age for first marriages for women and men was 22
and 24.7 years (respectively), increased to 25.6 and 27.5 at the start of the 2007
Great Recession, and had increased to 28.6 and 30.4 by 2021 during the COVID19 pandemic.57
Relative to young adults the same age from earlier generations, young adults
are now more likely to live in unmarried cohabitating (but partnered)
households.58 For example, in 1968, 0.1% of people ages 18-24 and 0.2% of
people ages 25-34 lived with an unmarried partner. Between 1989 and 2016, the
share of unmarried partnered households grew from 7% to 21% and the share of
unpartnered, i.e., neither married nor cohabiting, households also increased.59
Census data show that, by 2018, young adults were more likely to live with an
unmarried partner (9%) than to live with a spouse (7%).60

53
Id.; Mark Mather & Beth Jarosz, The Demography of Inequality in the United States, 69 POPULATION
BULL. 1, 11 (2014), https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/population-bulletin-2014-69-2united-statesinequality.pdf.
54
Aloni, supra note 33, at 45; Claire Cain Miller & Quoctrung Bui, Equality in Marriages Grows, and
So Does Class Divide, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/upshot/rise-in-marriages-ofequals-and-in-division-by-class.html.
55
Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; see Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53.
56
Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; Median Age at First Marriage, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?hidePreview=true&tid=ACSDT1Y2018.B12007&vintage=2018&moe=fal
se; see Melissa S. Kearney et al., The Puzzle of Falling US Birth Rates Since the Great Recession 9 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29286, 2021) (available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w29286).
57
See Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; Historical Marital Status Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2021),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/marital.html.
58
Gurrentz, supra note 45; Pamela J. Smock et al., “Everything’s There Except Money”: How Money
Shapes Decisions to Marry Among Cohabitants, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680, 686-87 (2005); Baker, supra note
17, at 217–18 (2020).
59
Parker & Stepler, supra note 42; Addo & Ricketts, supra note 47.
60
Similarly, 15% of young adults, ages 25-34, lived with an unmarried partner, which increased from
12% ten years earlier. Gurrentz, supra note 45.
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By 2016, roughly 38% of adults between the ages of 25 to 54 were
unpartnered––a sizeable increase from the 29% of unpartnered adults in 1990.61
One reason the unpartnered population expanded was because of the increase in
the number of previously married adults who are now separated, divorced, or
widowed. The main reason the number of unpartnered adults has grown since
1990, however, is because of lower marriage rates.62 Moreover, while there has
been an overall increase in the number of unpartnered young adults, there is an
increasingly gendered and socioeconomic pattern to who is unpartnered.
Compared to 30 years ago, men are now more likely than women to be
unmarried and unpartnered and there has been a seismic shift in the number of
unpartnered lower-income males.63
B. College Attendance Rates, Household Income, and Marriage
Young adults are choosing not to marry and are specifically choosing not to
marry lower-income males who do not have a college degree. Men with different
educational levels were about equally likely to have never been married in the
1960s but marriage rates for male college graduates and non-college males now
diverge sharply.64 For example, five years after the end of the 2007-2009 Great
Recession, non-college males were almost twice as likely to have never married
than male college graduates (25% vs. 14%).65 Marriage rates for non-college
61
Richard Fry & Kim Parker, Rising Share of U.S. Adults Are Living Without a Spouse or Partner, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2021/10/05/rising-share-of-u-s-adultsare-living-without-a-spouse-or-partner/. While all Millennials are more likely to be single and have no children
at the same age relative to previous generations, Blacks are the least likely to live in their own family units (46%)
relative to white and Latino Millennials (57%). Barroso et al., supra note 41. See generally Yerís Mayol-García
et al., Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2016, U.S. CENSUS Bureau 5–6 (Apr. 2021),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/demo/p70-167.pdf.
62
Richard Fry, The Share of Americans Living Without a Partner Has Increased, Especially Among
Young Adults, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/11/the-shareof-americans-living-without-a-partner-has-increased-especially-among-young-adults/.
63
Fry & Parker, supra note 61; see Parker et al., supra note 51.
64
In the 1960s, regardless of their educational levels, men were about equally likely to have never been
married. While women were willing to marry non-college males at that time, males were reluctant to marry
female college graduates as women with advanced degrees were more than four times as likely (31% vs. 7%) to
have never married compared to women with a high school education or less. Parker et al., supra note 51; Aloni,
supra note 34, at 45.

College-educated Millennial women are less likely to have a spouse with a college degree than
are their male counterparts (70% vs. 82%.) . . . [For the Boomers and Silent generation], men
were less likely to marry someone with a college degree than woman. This reversal can be
partially attributed to the fact that, during this time, fewer woman went to college, resulting in a
smaller pool of college-educated women for men to marry
Barroso et al., supra note 41.
65
Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RSCH. CTR. 9
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males have been dropping because: (1) more females are attending and
graduating from college;66 (2) young males are less likely to pursue a college
degree;67 (3) non-college workers have lower employment rates and earn less
than college graduates; and (4) female college graduates are less likely to marry
non-college males.
In the early 1980s, women and men attended college in roughly equal
numbers, though males were slightly more likely (27%) than females (21%) to
have earned a bachelor’s degree.68 Since then, college attendance rates increased
for both men and women, but now female college attendance and graduation
rates consistently exceed male rates, including at the graduate level.69 Male
college enrollment rates (particularly if they are lower-income) have lagged
female rates by at least ten percent since the early 1990s.70 By 2018, graduation
rates for females surpassed graduation rates for men by more than five
percentage points.71

(Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/09/2014-09-24_NeverMarried-Americans.pdf.
66
See Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Women, Men and the New Economics of Marriage, PEW RSCH CTR.
(Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2010/01/19/women-men-and-the-new-economicsof-marriage/ (“Among U.S.-Born-30-to 44-year-olds, women are now the majority both of college graduates
and those who have some college education but not a degree”).
67
Barroso et al., supra note 41.
68
Richard V. Reeves & Ember Smith, The Male College Crisis Is Not Just in Enrollment, but Completion,
BROOKINGS INST.: BLOG (Oct. 8, 2021) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/10/08/the-male-collegecrisis-is-not-just-in-enrollment-but-completion/ (By 1982, the gap [in proportion of bachelor’s degrees going to
men compared to women] had closed.”); Barroso et al., supra note 41; Kristen Bialik & Richard Fry, Millennial
Life: How Young Adulthood Today Compares with Prior Generations, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/02/14/millennial-life-how-young-adulthood-today-compareswith-prior-generations-2/.
69
Roughly one-third of young adults (ages 25–34) now have a college degree compared to less than a
quarter in 1975. Parker & Stepler, supra note 42. Women now receive 57% of bachelor’s degrees and 52% of
doctoral degrees (including PhDs, JDs and MDs). U.S. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 162 (2015) (available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2015/pdf/ERP-2015-chapter4.
pdf). See generally Table 302.60. Percentage of 18- to 24-Year-Olds Enrolled in College, by Level of Institution
and Sex and Race/Ethnicity of Student: 1970 Through 2017, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATS.: DIGEST OF EDUC.
STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_302.60.asp (showing the percentage of young
adults who enrolled in college from 1970-2017 by sex, race, and ethnicity).
70
While men lag behind women in terms of high school and college graduation rates, recent research
notes that straight women have made the most academic progress but that gay males (across racial groups) have
better educational outcomes than straight women or men. Joel Mittleman, Intersection the Academic Gender
Gap: The education of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual America, AMER. SOC. REV. 1, 14, 19 (2022).
71
Kristen Bialik & Richard Fry, Millennial Life: How Young Adulthood Today Compares with Prior
Generations, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/02/14/millennial-lifehow-young-adulthood-today-compares-with-prior-generations-2/.
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Lower male college attendance and graduation rates have caused male
unemployment rates to increase even as overall labor market participation rates
improved for young adults since the 1970s. The share of employed young men
has either remained the same or has declined over the last several decades72 and
even before unemployment rates spiked during the COVID-19 recession roughly
20% of males ages 25-54 had permanently dropped out of the labor force.73
Despite consistently high worker productivity for all income groups,74 wages
have largely been stagnant for lower- and middle-income workers since the
1980s and inequality gaps between the richest workers and middle-income
workers remain at record levels.75 Average wages for full-time male workers
started falling in the mid-1970s and that, combined with the gender college
attainment gap, created an enormous earnings gap between college and noncollege workers. Non-college males earn roughly $900,000 less in average
lifetime earnings compared to males with college degrees.76
Higher college attendance and graduation rates for higher-income young
adults (who are disproportionately white) coupled with higher earnings for
college graduates (who also are disproportionately white) continue to exacerbate
income and wealth inequality gaps as well as racial inequality gaps.77 The
72
Parker et al., supra note 51; Marital Status, supra note 51 (“Labor force participation among men—
particularly young men—has fallen significantly over the past several decades. In 1960, 93% of men ages 25 to
34 were in the labor force; by 2012 that share had fallen to 82%.”).
73
Addressing America’s Crisis of Despair and Economic Recovery: A Call for a Coordinated Effort,
BROOKINGS INST. 2 (July 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Addressing-Americas-crisisdespair-economic-recovery.pdf. Although unemployment rates increased for college graduates during the
COVID-19 recession, rates for non-college workers were significantly higher. Prepared Testimony on Economic
Disparities and the Economic Challenges Facing American Families Before the H. Select Comm. on Economic
Disparity and Fairness in Growth 5, 117th Cong. 5 (2021) (statement of Jason Furman, Professor of Economics,
Harvard University), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/furman2021-07-29.pdf.
74
See Heather Boushey & Kavya Vaghul, Women Have Made the Difference for Family Economic
Security, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 5 (Apr. 4, 2016), https://equitablegrowth.org/women-havemade-the-difference-for-family-economic-security/; Heidi Shierholz, Strengthening Labor Standards and
Institutions to Promote Wage Growth, HAMILTON PROJECT 4–6 (Feb. 2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/
assets/files/strengthening_labor_standards_shierholz_pp.pdf.
75
See Jessica Semega et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5, 7
(Sept. 2020, revised Sept. 2021); The State of Financial Security 2020: A Framework for Recovery and
Resilience, ASPEN INST. 13 (2020), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-State-ofFinancial-Security-2020-1.pdf.
76
Education and Lifetime Earnings, SSA (Nov. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/researchsummaries/education-earnings.html. Non-college young adults have been particularly hard hit in the labor
markets over the last several decades. Wages for Millennial workers with college degrees are comparable to
wages for older workers with college degrees, while wages for non-college young workers lag the wages noncollege workers in prior generations earned at the same age. Bialik & Fry, supra note 75.
77
The earnings premium that college-educated workers receive exacerbates income and wealth racial
inequality gaps because college graduates are disproportionately white and born in upper-income families. See
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income inequality gap has dramatically expanded since the 1980s. For example,
between 1979 and 2015, the richest top 1% of earners increased their income by
approximately 242%, while wages for middle-income workers only increased
by 46%.78 While the top 1% of households received 10% of total earned income
(and the bottom 20% earned 3% of earned income) in 1979, by 2017 the top
earners garnered 18% of total earned income (and the share of income earned by
the bottom 20% dropped to 2%).79 Wealth inequality gaps, even more extreme
than income gaps, expanded after the 2007-2009 Recession particularly for
young adults.80 Although low unemployment rates helped lower- and middleincome workers recover most of their income and wealth losses by 2016, the
disproportionately negative effect the COVID-19 recession had on lower- and
middle-income families erased many of the gains these financially vulnerable
households made after the 2007 Recession.81
The college attainment gap makes it less likely that young adults will marry
and live in traditional husband-at-work and wife-at-home households. As noted
earlier, Black single mothers were never encouraged to bypass the paid labor
market to remain at home and provide uncompensated care for their children. In
addition, because Black males have always earned less than white males, Black
married couple households have generally consisted of dual-earners.82 Now,
however, the decrease in the number of lower-income white male college

Table 302.60. Percentage of 18- to 24-Year-Olds Enrolled in College, by Level of Institution and Sex and
Race/Ethnicity of Student: 1970 Through 2017, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATS.: DIGEST OF EDUC. STATS., https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_302.60.asp.
78
Alex Fox, America’s Income Inequality Gap is Growing, THE HILL (Nov. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/
changing-america/466911-americas-income-inequality-gap-is-growing-heres-why-thats-a-bad-situation.
Income shares for the top earners have consistently increased since the Great Recession and the rising income
share for the Top 3% of all earners in 2013 was a mirror image of the declining income share of the bottom 90%
of all earners. Jesse Bricker, et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances 10, 11 FED. RSRV. BULL. (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2014/pdf/scf14.pdf.
79
Prepared Testimony on Economic Disparities and the Economic Challenges Facing American
Families Before the H. Select Comm. on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth 5, 117th Cong. 5 (2021)
(statement of Jason Furman, Professor of Economics, Harvard University), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/
files/documents/furman2021-07-29.pdf; see Elise Gould, State of Working America: Wages 2018, ECON. POL’Y.
INST. 1, 3–4 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://files.epi.org/pdf/161043.pdf (noting that inequality, particularly for women
and non-whites, widened pre-COVID even though unemployment rates were low and labor market participation
was high.).
80
See Ana Hernandez Kent et al., Are Millennials a Lost Generation Financially?, (Dec. 17, 2019)
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/december/millennials-lost-generation-financially.
81
See Patricia Cohen, Bump in U.S. Incomes Doesn’t Erase 50 Years of Pain, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/business/economy/bump-in-us-incomes-doesnt-erase-50-yearsof-pain.html.
82
See e.g., Brown, supra note 35, at 5, 9–10, 53.
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graduates,83 overall declining male employment rates, and stagnant wages have
made it harder for many white wives to afford the luxury of being a “traditional”
stay-at-home mother84 and many are now forced to work in the paid labor
market.
As noted on Figure 1, the employment rates between women and men
have narrowed significantly since the 1960s.

Figure 1
Male wages generally remain higher than female wages because of historical
discrimination against women in the labor market and because women are
disproportionately employed in lower-wage service sector jobs.85 With more
women working in the paid labor market, however, that gender wage gap is
shrinking86 and lifetime earnings for female workers are increasing, particularly

83
The growing college attainment disparities are particularly stark for white males who historically had
the highest graduation rates. Asians now hold the highest percentage of students with bachelor’s degrees. See
Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 495.
84
See Jonathan Vespa, The Changing Economics and Demographics of Young Adulthood: 1975-2016,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 10 (April 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/
demo/p20-579.pdf.
85
See generally Boushey & Vaghul, supra note 74. The recent focus on the economic and emotional
plight of non-college white males who lost their high-wage blue collar jobs often ignores the additional story of
the number of non-college wives who took low-wage jobs in the paid labor market and the fact that their lowwage jobs did not pay them enough to make up for their husbands’ lost wages. See Campbell Robertson, In Coal
Country, the Mines Shut Down, the Women Went to Work and the World Quietly Changed, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/us/appalachia-coal-women-work-.html.
86
Contra Elise Gould, Looking at the Latest Wage Data By Education Level, ECON. POL’Y INST.:
WORKING ECONS. BLOG (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.epi.org/blog/looking-at-the-latest-wage-data-by-educationlevel/. See generally U.S. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 157–202 (2015)
(available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2015/pdf/ERP-2015-chapter4.pdf) (discussing increased
participation of women in the labor force and provides policies that could make workplaces more familyfriendly).
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for female workers with college and graduate degrees.87 In fact, much of the
increase in household income for lower- and middle-income families has
occurred because of higher female wages, not because of rising male wages.88
A recent demography report explains that “[t]he rise in female labor force
participation has transformed gender relations, changed patterns of marriage and
childbearing, and is often viewed as a key indicator of women’s progress toward
gender equality at home and in the workforce.”89 As women became more
economically self-sufficient, they also became less convinced that they would
only find emotional fulfillment and financial security if they lived in a traditional
household. Likewise, the greater economic security female college graduates
attained by working in the paid labor market gave them less of a “need” to
depend on a husband for economic security.
Many young women view getting their college degree as a higher priority
than getting married.90 Because of this, they are choosing to avoid or delay
getting married and having children at rates that exceed the rates for women in
prior generations. Marriage rates for female college graduates now exceed rates
for non-college female workers but, when they marry, they are choosing to
marry males who are financially secure.91 That is, females with post-graduate
degrees were more than four times as likely to have never married in 1960
compared to non-college women (31% vs. 7%), but by 2012, female college
graduates had higher marriage rates than non-college females and the nevermarried gap between those groups had largely disappeared.92 In addition to
making women feel less economically dependent on males, higher educational
attainment rates for females and lower overall wages for males has created the
perception that lower-income non-college males are not marriage material.

87
See Elise Gould & Julia Wolfe, Income Growth in 2016 is Strong, But Not as Strong as 2015 and More
Uneven, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECONS. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2017, 12:04 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/
income-growth-in-2016-is-strong-but-not-as-strong-as-2015-and-more-uneven/; see Cavanagh & Fomby, supra
note 11. The gender wage gap for millennials, better educated than prior generations, is smaller than gaps for
prior generations at their age in large part because millennial women were the first generation to earn college
degrees in higher numbers than men. Bialik & Fry, supra note 75.
88
See Boushey & Vaghul, supra note 74.
89
Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53.
90
See Wang & Parker, supra note 65; Field, supra note 75; Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding Young
Women’s Marriage Decisions: The Role of Labor and Marriage Market Conditions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 624, 625 (2000).
91
Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 494–96.
92
Wang & Parker, supra note 65.
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C. Marriagibility and “Assortative Mating”
Most Americans across income groups, educational levels, and races report
that they would like to be married, but shifts in what constitutes a marriageable
partner has caused fewer young adults to say “I do.”93 Young adults of all races
and genders now consider financial stability when deciding whether to marry
and will avoid marriage if they conclude that they (or a potential spouse) have
not met certain baseline economic standards. Increasingly, women are avoiding
marriage because of their perception that there are no marriageable males.94
Men and women of marriageable age (too old to be college students, but not
yet old enough to retire) are viewed as unmarriageable for a range of reasons,
though the main disqualifier is the appearance of economic instability. Some
males are deemed unmarriageable because they are incarcerated,95 while others
are deemed unmarriageable because they have felony convictions that limit their
employment options.96 Potential mates are also deemed unmarriageable if they
have stopped working (or looking for work), have unstable employment,97 or if
they do not have savings or other sources of personal wealth (like a car or home)
and generally appear incapable of financially supporting themselves or a family.
Particularly for people born after the 1980s when credit card availability became
almost universal and college costs started to skyrocket, high credit card and
student loan debts also deem potential spouses to be unmarriageable.98
93
See Barroso et al., supra note 45; Vespa, supra note 84 (noting that Americans now place higher values
on educational and economic accomplishments over marrying and having children).
94
Black women are more likely to be never married because of their perception that there are fewer
“marriageable” Black males. Deirdre Bloome & Shannon Ang, Marriage and Union Formation in the United
States: Recent Trends Across Racial Groups and Economic Backgrounds, 57 DEMOGRAPHY 1753, 1757 (2020)
(available at https://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article/57/5/1753/168376/Marriage-and-Union-Formation-inthe-United-States). Men are more likely than women to have never married but also have higher overall marriage
rates. Rates vary by race with Black males having the highest never married rates among males. Wang & Parker,
supra note 65; see Marital Status, supra note 51.
95
The Moynihan Report and more recent research find that higher unemployment rates and significantly
higher incarceration rates for Black males has depressed Black marriage rates. See Harry J. Holzer, Why Are
Employment Rates so Low Among Black Men?, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/why-are-employment-rates-so-low-among-black-men/ (noting that unemployment rates undercount
incarcerated Black males and indicating that declining employment rates correlate with declining marriage
rates).
96
Ryan Larson et al., Felon History and Change in U.S. Employment Rates, 102 SOC. SCI. RSCH. 1, 2
(2021), http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/Larson_Shannon_Sojourner_Uggen_SSR_21.pdf (noting that while
the overall employment rate for adults with incarceration records is 8%, rates for Blacks overall (23%) and Black
males specifically (33%) are significantly higher).
97
Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 497.
98
See Fenaba R. Addo, Debt, Cohabitation, and Marriage in America in Young Adulthood, 51
DEMOGRAPHY 1677, 1678, 1680 (2014) (indicating that acquiring debt in young adulthood contributes to fewer
marriages). Young adults with higher-than-average credit card debt are more likely to cohabitate than young
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In the 1950s, when young adults married at earlier ages and overall marriage
rates were higher, partners did not seem concerned if their spouse’s educational
background was different from theirs.99 When today’s young adults choose a
spouse, however, they are more likely to date and marry someone with a similar
socio-economic and educational background, and they are increasingly
unwilling to marry someone who is not financially independent. For example, a
recent survey showed that slightly more than half (51%) of never-married young
(18-29-year-olds) adults report delaying or avoiding marriage because of
concerns about their potential spouse’s financial stability.100 The share (63%) of
young men who were financially independent (based on their annual income) in
1980 dropped to 52% by 2018 and dropped as low as 45% just after the Great
Recession ended in 2010 while the share of financially independent women
increased from 38% to 42% during this same period. This financial stability
mismatch increasing causes women to avoid marrying males if they conclude
their potential spouse does not satisfy the financial-stability marriageability
criteria.101
Marriage rates for non-college males (whose earnings potential is lower
given stagnant income for all but the highest earners) relative to rates for male
college graduates are lower now than comparable rates for college/non-college
males in prior generations.102 Relative to their lower-income peers, higherincome young adults seem less concerned about their partner’s financial
stability, which is not surprising as they tend to select partners with similar
economic attributes. The combination of the gender college attainment gap,
declining wages for non-college males, and assortative mating has had a
dramatic effect on marriage rates and the formation of traditional households.
Assortative mating also exacerbates income and wealth inequality gaps since
adults with less debt and women with student loans are less likely than women without educational debt to marry.
Id.
99
Miller & Bui, supra note 54. This phenomenon is not unique to the United States. According to 2011
data on 34 different countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for couples
where both partners work, “40% [of couples] belong to the same or neighboring income bracket, up from 33
percent two decades ago,” and “two-thirds [of couples] have the same level of education.” Id.
100
Vespa, supra note 84, at 2–3, 6.
101
Amanda Barroso et al., Majority of Americans Say Parents are Doing Too Much for Their Young Adult
Children, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/10/23/majority-ofamericans-say-parents-are-doing-too-much-for-their-young-adult-children/; see Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note
11, at 496. Non-college adults are less likely to marry and more likely to move from one cohabitating relationship
to another because of concerns that their partner is unmarriageable or that marriage itself is economically
infeasible. Addo, supra note 104, at 1680; see Karen Benjamin Guzzo, Trends in Cohabitation Outcomes:
Compositional Changes and Engagement Among Never-Married Young Adults, 76 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 826,
835, 840 (2014).
102
Bialik & Fry, supra note 75.

DICKERSON_PROOF_5.18.22

2022]

5/18/2022 1:26 PM

THE IDEAL DEBTOR

205

college graduates (who prefer to marry each other) are more likely to be white
and are significantly less likely to be poor compared to non-college adults.103
III. THE NEW “TRADITIONAL” HOUSEHOLD WITH (OR WITHOUT) CHILDREN
As discussed in detail in Part I, traditional households are favored and
subsidized because of the belief that it is better for children to be reared by their
married parents in the same household. Despite the idealized traditional
household where the married mother remains home to care for young children
while her husband earns enough money in the labor market to support his family,
today’s “traditional” household is more likely to consist of a multi-generational
family, single parents, unmarried partners, childless married couples, and
married parents who both earn income in the paid labor market.
A. Inability to Form Households
Historically, most parents in this country financially supported their children
until they graduated from college or became financially independent adults.
Because it is taking longer for young adults to become financially independent
and form their own separate households, many parents have dramatically
changed their lifestyles to provide support for their adult children. For example,
more parents are now paying for their children’s college expenses because it is
no longer common (as it was before the 1980s) for young adults to work their
way through college. Soaring college costs have made it nearly impossible for
students to pay for a bachelor’s degree, which has caused more lower- and
middle-income parents to take out high-cost Parent PLUS loans to help their
children attain a college degree.
While noble, parents are now sacrificing their own long-term financial wellbeing to help their children become financially independent. Repaying PLUS
loans often causes parents to deplete their retirement savings, cease saving for
their own retirement, or use their current income to repay loan debt rather than
pay their current expenses.104 Unlike the loans students take out for themselves,
parent loans are payable immediately and cannot be deferred until the student
graduates, even if parents temporarily or permanently lose their jobs.105 Parents

103

Miller & Bui, supra note 54; Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53, at 12.
Aloni, supra note 33, at 26–27 (noting that middle-class families typically give their children financial
transfers during their lifetimes not as bequests); Michelle Fox, Parents are Sacrificing Their Own Financial
Wellness to Support Their Adult Children, Survey Finds, CNBC (May 5, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2021/05/05/parents-are-sacrificing-their-own-financial-wellness-to-support-their-adult-children.html.
105
Although Parent PLUS loans are a small percentage of total current federal student debt, parents who
104
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(unlike students) cannot participate in debt restructuring programs that reduce
monthly loan payments or partially forgive debt and also cannot participate in
federal income-based repayment (IBR) programs even though PLUS loans are
often approved after a rudimentary credit check and without regard to the
parents’ ability to repay the loan.106 Like student borrowers, however, parent
borrowers generally cannot discharge student loan debt in bankruptcy and, if
they default on the loans, they risk having their federal tax returns confiscated
or their social security benefits garnished.107
Because it is taking longer for young adults to become financially
independent, parents now routinely subsidize their adult children’s short- and
long-term living expenses and sometimes agree to repay their children’s students
loans in addition to their own PLUS loans.108 For example, nearly 40% of young
adults (ages 18 to 24, and nearly 20% between ages 25 and 29) in 2019 reported
that they received financial support from someone who lives outside their home,
typically their parents.109 During the COVID-19 pandemic, roughly 45% of
parents in households (across all income groups) gave their adult children money
to pay their debts or to pay for basic necessities like food, housing, transportation
and cellular phone service.110
Although young Latino adults are more likely (45%) to live with their
parents than young Black (27%) or white (21%) adults,111 young adults generally
are struggling to establish their own households and are increasingly living with
relatives.112 Adult children now live in their parents’ home at rates that far
borrow Parent PLUS loans constitute increasingly large shares of people (students and parents) who have higher
interest rate loans. “At the end of [2020], there were 3.6 million loan recipients with nearly $101 billion in parent
PLUS loans—an increase of about 40 percent from $72.2 billion (adjusted for inflation) at the end of 2014.”
Tara Siegel Bernard, A Federal College Loan Program Can Trap Parents in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, (June 6, 2021,
updated Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/your-money/parent-plus-loans-debt.html.
106
Cf. Tara Siegel Bernard, A Federal College Loan Program Can Trap Parents in Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
(June 6, 2021, updated Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/your-money/parent-plus-loans-debt.html
(stating PLUS loan borrowers only have access to the most expensive income-driven repayment plan).
107
Adam Looney & Vivien Lee, Parents are Borrowing More and More to Send Their Kids to College—
and Many Are Struggling to Repay, BROOKINGS INST., (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
parents-are-borrowing-more-and-more-to-send-their-kids-to-college-and-many-are-struggling-to-repay/.
108
FINRA, Financial Capability in the United States, 12 (2016) https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/
downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf. Amanda Barroso et al., supra note 101.
109
Bialik & Fry, supra note 75.
110
Fox, supra note 104 (defining adult children as ages 18-29).
111
BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS
IN 2017 33 (May 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-beingus-households-201805.pdf.
112
Richard Fry et al., U.S. Household Growth Over the Last Decade was the Lowest Ever Recorded, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/10/12/u-s-household-growth-overlast-decade-was-the-lowest-ever-recorded/; see Richard Fry et al., A Majority of Young Adults in the US Live
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exceed rates for prior generations and they are remaining in their parents’ homes
for extended periods.113 Job losses, college shutdowns during the early months
of the COVID-19 pandemic, and declining college attendance rates for males
(particularly lower-income non-white males) caused, for the first time since the
Great Depression, a majority of young adults (particularly males) to live with
their parents.114 Because even young and employed college graduates have
returned home to live with their parents,115 household growth from 2010-2020
was the lowest ever recorded (the previous low was from 2000-2010).116 More
alarming, for the first time since 1850, there has been an increase in the size of
the average U.S. household but a decrease in the rate of household growth.117
One reason young adults seem willing to live in their parents’ home is
because the norms concerning what it means to be an adult have changed.
Compared to earlier generations, young adults no longer view moving out of
their parents’ home as an important part of adulthood and many appear to be
satisfied with their lives even if they still live in their parents’ home. A recent
study reveals that “most parents with coresidential adult children are just as
with Their Parents for the First Time Since the Great Depression, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/04/a-majority-of-young-adults-in-the-u-s-live-with-their-parents-for-thefirst-time-since-the-great-depression/ (explaining that the largest increase in young adults who returned home to
live with their parents are white, non-college young adults).
113
Bialik & Fry, supra note 75; see BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 111.
114
A Majority of Young Adults, supra note 112; see Bialik & Fry, supra note 75. COVID-19 widened the
gender college attainment gap. While college enrollments dropped for all races and genders, the decrease in male
undergraduate enrollment was almost three times the drop for female enrollment. Compare Current Term
Enrollment Estimates: Spring 2021, NAT’L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE RSCH. CTR., https://nscresearchcenter.
org/current-term-enrollment-estimates/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2022), with Current Term Enrollment Estimates:
Spring 2018, NAT’L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE RSCH. CTR., https://nscresearchcenter.org/current-termenrollment-estimates/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2022). Enrollment declines were most pronounced for male students
of color who attended community colleges as data show the Black, Latino, and Indigenous male enrollment at
public two-year colleges plummeted by 19.2%, 16.6% and 20.1%, respectively. Kelly Field, The Missing Men,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 1, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-missing-men.
115
One in three young people ages 18 to 34 lived in their parents’ home in 2015 and 15% of Millennials
(ages 25 to 37) were living in their parents’ home in 2018 as compared to 8% of Baby Boomers and 9% of Gen
Xers at the same age. Vespa, supra note 84, at 1–2; Bialik & Fry, supra note 75. Similarly, one in four of the
25- to 34-year-olds who lived in their parents’ home in 2015 are classified as “idle” because they did not have
jobs and were not in school. Vespa, supra note 84, at 2.
116
Richard Fry et al., U.S. Household Growth Over Last Decade Was the Lowest Ever Recorded, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/10/12/u-s-household-growth-overlast-decade-was-the-lowest-ever-recorded/.
117
Richard Fry, The Number of People in the Average U.S. Household is Going up for the First Time in
Over 160 years, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/01/thenumber-of-people-in-the-average-u-s-household-is-going-up-for-the-first-time-in-over-160-years/; see Solana
Rice et al., Whose Bad Choices? How Policy Precludes Prosperity and What We Can Do About It, PROSPERITY
NOW SCORECARD 7–8 (2018), https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/resources/2018-Prosperity-NowScorecard-Main-Findings-Report_0.pdf.
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satisfied with their living arrangements as parents whose adult children live
somewhere else.”118 Indeed, many adult children and their parents now embrace
(or at a minimum, grudgingly accept) the concept of an “emerging adulthood”
where young adults may not reach financial or emotional independence until
they are 30.119
Although young adults may be willing to live with their parents, most would
still like to start their own households in a home they own.120 Young adults
appear to be avoiding homeownership for several reasons. Some young adults
fear buying homes because they watched their parents lose their homes during
the 2007-2009 Great Recession. Others (particularly young, college-educated
professionals) who may want to move to another town for a better job
opportunity often prefer being mobile to being tied to a mortgage loan. The main
reason young adults are not buying homes, though, is that they cannot afford to
be a homeowner.
Overall homeownership rates for young adults increased slightly in 2015121
and high-income young adults purchased homes during the COVID pandemic
when interest rates plunged. However, overall homeownership rates (like
marriage and childbearing rates) for young adults remain at historic lows122
given their stagnant wages, low household savings, and crushing student loan
debt (particularly if they attended college but did not graduate).123 Moreover,
118

Vespa, supra note 84, at 3.
See generally Anthony P. Carnevale et al., If Not Now, When? The Urgent Need for an All-One-System
Approach to Youth Policy, GEO. UNIV.: MCCOURT SCH. PUB. POL’Y 9 (2021), https://cew.georgetown.edu/cewreports/allonesystem/; Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Parents and Adult Children: The Elusive Boundaries of the Legal
Family, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 519, 523 (2019) (explaining that adult children who live with their parents during
periods of financial crises are not perceived as immature or financially irresponsible if they contribute to the
household by paying expenses or they provide help with household duties or chores). Amanda Barroso et al.,
supra note 101, at 2 (explaining that despite the concept of emerging adulthood, polls indicate that most people
believe that young adults rely too much on their parents and should be financially independent by the time they
are twenty-two years old).
120
See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 111; see also New Survey Reveals Affordability Challenges for
Renters and Homeowners, FREDDIE MAC: CONSUMER RSCH. (June 26, 2019) http://www.freddiemac.com/
research/consumer-research/20190626_new_survey_affordability.page (explaining that most people now see
renting as more affordable than home-owning).
121
See BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 111.
122
For example, just over 41% of all households headed by someone younger than the age of 35 were
homeowners in 1982. By 1994, that number dropped to just over 37% and as of 2016 stood at just over 35%.
Similarly, the share of new homeowners under the age of 30 declined from 29% in 2001 to approximately 15%
in 2015). Richard Fry & Anna Brown, In a Recovering Market, Homeownership Rates Are Down Sharply for
Blacks, Young Adults, PEW RSCH. CTR. 4 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2016/12/Home-ownership-report-FINAL.pdf.
123
Student Loans Owned and Securitized, FRED ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLOAS
(last accessed Feb. 17, 2021); Jean Song, Student Debt “Feels Like Quicksand.” Is Loan Forgiveness the
119
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given the dearth of affordable housing, particularly in high opportunity cities,124
it is virtually impossible for lower- and middle-income young adults to qualify
for a mortgage and buy a home.125
Rising housing costs, particularly since the 2007-2009 Recession, has made
it more likely that even middle-income young married couples with children will
be renters126 rather than homeowners.127 As a result of soaring housing prices,
homeowners are now more likely to be older, white, married, higher-income
college graduates.128 But since even young college graduates are struggling to
buy homes, high income and wealthy parents are stepping in to help their adult
children become homeowners.
As was true during the mid-2000s housing bubble, many young buyers in
hot housing markets find themselves engaged in bidding wars for homes listed
at prices that exceed the appraised value of the home. Lenders generally refuse
to approve mortgage loans for amounts that exceed the market value of the
home, so buyers must make all-cash offers to be competitive. Cash-strapped
young buyers with wealthy parents or grandparents are now turning to their older
relatives for money to make down payments or to make all-cash offers. Wealthy
relatives who lack cash savings to loan (or give) their younger relatives often
Answer? CBS NEWS (Mar. 25, 2021, 6:59 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-loan-debt-forgivenessdilemma/.
124
See also Richard Fry et al., supra note 112.
125
See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 111, at 28–31; see also New Survey Reveals Affordability
Challenges for Renters and Homeowners, supra note 128 (explaining that most people now see renting as more
affordable than home-owning).
126
Between 2010 to 2018, households with earnings that exceeded $75,000 accounted for 76% of the
growth in renter households and high-income households now make up nearly a quarter of all renter households.
America’s Rental Housing 2020, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV. 10, 11 (2020), https://www.
jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2020.pdf.
127
Renters now outnumber homeowners in almost half (47%) of the major cities in this country, roughly
double (21%) the number in 2006. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELLBEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2019, FEATURING SUPPLEMENTAL DATA FROM APRIL 2020, 30–41 (May 2020)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202005.
pdf (showing that only 25% of 18- to 29-year-olds owned homes in 2019 while 85% of people over the age of
60 were homeowners); Fry & Brown, supra note 122 (explaining that as the average age of first-time home
buyers increases, the proportion of homeowner households headed by younger adults decreases).
128
Meredith Dunn, Throwback Thursday: First-Time Homebuyers Then and Now, NAT’L ASS’N
REALTORS: ECONOMISTS’ OUTLOOK (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nar.realtor/blogs/economists-outlook/
throwback-thursday-first-time-homebuyers-then-and-now (explaining that only 54% of first-time buyers were
married couples, consistent with overall lower marriage rates and noting the increase in young adults who lived
with parents, relatives, or friends); Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53, at 7 (“The gap in housing affordability
between owners and renters exacerbates the economic divide between older and younger age groups because
older Americans are more likely to be homeowners.”); BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 127 (showing 71% of
white adults owned their homes in 2020 while just over 50% of Latinos and only 48% of Blacks were
homeowners).
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take out a mortgage loan or home equity line of credit (or refinance an existing
mortgage) on their home to give their younger relatives enough money to outbid
other less resourced competitors.129
While having access to family wealth is particularly crucial for young
potential home buyers in expensive housing markets, renters who receive even
modest ($5,000) financial support from their older relatives: (1) are 15% more
likely than young adults who do not have access to wealthy relatives to become
homeowners; (2) buy homes sooner; and (3) make larger down payments.130 In
fact, one recent study found that the financial transfer itself – not the young
adult’s or the parents’ income, wealth or educational attainment – increases the
likelihood that a young renter will become a homeowner.131 Because the young
adults who are now most likely to buy homes and establish a traditional
household are higher-income or have access to family wealth and those young
adults typically are white, fewer non-white and lower-income young adults are
buying homes and establishing their own independent households.
B. More Single-Parent Households
Public policies continue to encourage and subsidize traditional two-parent
households because they are viewed as more financially132 and emotionally
stable133 than single-parent households,134 and recent polls suggest that
Americans increasingly believe that it is bad for society when single women
raise children on their own (or when unmarried couples cohabitate).135 Children
typically experience “poorer outcomes when their parents are not married”136
and children reared in single-mother households are more likely to live in
129
See Leigh Kamping-Carder, Millennials’ New Weapon in Bidding Wars: A Parent’s Home Equity,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennialss-new-weapon-in-bidding-warsa-parents-home-equity-1507645135 (explaining that after closing, the young buyer takes out a mortgage on the
newly acquired (debt-free) home and uses the loan proceeds to repay their older relative(s)).
130
See Hyojung Lee et al., The Role of Parental Financial Assistance in the Transition to Homeownership
by Young Adults, 47 J. HOUS. ECON 2, 3 (Mar. 2020).
131
See id.
132
Married parents are the least likely to be in poverty followed by nonmarital partners then single parents.
Livingston, supra note 37. Although the increase in single-parent households accounted for much of the increase
in child poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, parents’ inability to find stable jobs has also increased child poverty.
Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53.
133
See Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 497.
134
For example, in discussing the rise in Black single-mother households, the Moynihan Report observed
that children’s “dependence on the mother’s income undermines the position of the father and deprives the
children of the kind of attention, particularly in school matters, which is now a standard feature of middle-class
upbringing.” The Moynihan Report, supra note 49, at 25.
135
Hurst, supra note 42.
136
Matsumura, supra note 18, at 482.
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poverty,137 have poorer educational outcomes,138 and less wealth as adults139
compared to single-person (particularly single-mother) households.140
Despite positive public sentiments for marriage and the economic
advantages married mothers who live in a traditional household receive, women
are increasingly choosing to remain unmarried and to rear their children in
single-parent households.141 Black, lower-income and non-college mothers are
more likely to have children but not marry the fathers of their children, while
higher-income mothers with bachelor’s degrees are significantly more likely to
be married (90%) when they have children compared to women with a 2-year
degree (57%) or women who never attended college (41%).142
Women are rearing their children in single-parent households for a range of
reasons. Some unmarried mothers were married to the fathers of their children
and became single parents through widowhood or divorce. Other mothers chose

137

Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53.
A recent longitudinal study that analyzed 30 years of national data found that Black children who are
reared in two-parent households do not receive the same benefits as other children reared in two-parent
households and that living apart from a biological parent does not impose the same cost on Black children as it
does for white children. Christina Cross, Racial/Ethnic Differences in the Association Between Family Structure
and Children’s Education, 82 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 691, 708 (2020). For example, while living in a twoparent family increases the likelihood that a white child will finish high school and be upwardly mobile, this is
not the case for Black children primarily because of the socioeconomic stresses Black two-parent households
face and the fact that Blacks are more likely to live in poverty due to decades of structural racism. Given this,
Black children face economic barriers whether they live with one- or-two parents. Id. The study also found that
living in a single-mother household was not as harmful to Black children educationally because they are more
likely to be embedded in an extended family network that helps mitigate any potential harm that results from
living with just one parent. Id.
139
Blau et al., supra note 90. In addition, girls reared in lower-income households are less likely to marry
as adults and are more likely to have children outside of marriage (often with multiple partners). Cavanagh &
Fomby, supra note 11, at 503.
140
Mather & Jarosz, supra note 53. The increase in single mother households contributed to the overall
increase in income inequality over the last several decades though the gap was somewhat reduced by an increase
in the number of single mothers who worked in labor markets. Id. Black and Latino two-parent families do not
have as much wealth as white two-parent families and, in fact, have half the wealth of white single parents. Amy
Traub et al., The Asset Value of Whiteness: Understanding the Racial Wealth Gap, DEMOS 7 (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Asset%20Value%20of%20Whiteness_0.pdf. Recent research
finds that, while the Black-White mobility gap shrinks for Black children who grow up in low-poverty
neighborhoods where there is a large presence of fathers, less than 5% of Black children grow up in these
neighborhoods. Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational
Perspective, 135 Q. J. ECON. 711, 711 (2020), https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/2/711/5687353.
141
See Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 8–9.
142
One reason the children of upper-income and college-educated mothers are more likely to live in twoparent households is because those mothers have higher marriage rates and college graduates typically marry
people with college degrees. Cf. Births to Unmarried Women: Indicators on Children and Youth, CHILD TRENDS:
DATA BANK 9 (Dec. 2015), https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/75_Births_to_Unmarried_
Women.pdf [https://perma.cc/STP8-8AY2].
138
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to rear children in single-parent households because the fathers of their children
did not marry them or they deem those males to be unmarriageable.143 In
addition, just as no-fault divorce laws de-stigmatized divorce and weakened the
social norm that marriage is a permanent relationship,144 the increase in the
number of divorced women (particularly white women) rearing children helped
de-stigmatize single motherhood and made it more likely that women would
choose to be single mothers.145 While the share of single-parent families has
roughly tripled since the 1960s, the share of unmarried single mothers has not
significantly increased because of overall declining birth rates.146
C. More Childless Households
Women of all races and ages, whether married or single and across the
socioeconomic spectrum, are avoiding or postponing having children or are
having fewer children. Although most women in the United States are mothers,
as shown on Figure 2, birth rates have been falling since the 1960s.

143
See Baker, supra note 14, at 225–26; Kearney et al., supra note 60, at 15 (“[I]mprovements in men’s
labor market conditions lead to increases in birth rates.”).
144
Matsumura, supra note 18, at 477.
145
See Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 14; Sabrina Tavernise et al., Why American Women Everywhere
Are Delaying Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021, updated Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/06/16/us/declining-birthrate-motherhood.html. While Black mothers remain more likely to be single
parents than other mothers, single-mother household rates have increased for all races. Births to Unmarried
Women: Indicators on Children and Youth, supra note 142. Indeed, while most discussions about single-mother
households presume the mother is Black, the most dramatic shift in household formation involves middle- or
working-class whites. Cavanagh & Fomby, supra note 11, at 497 (noting that white children who are not rich
are increasingly less likely to live in a traditional household are more likely to live with cohabitating adults).
146
Eleanor Krause & Isabel V. Sawhill, Seven Reasons to Worry About the American Middle Class,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2018/06/05/sevenreasons-to-worry-about-the-american-middle-class/?utm_medium=social&u; JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CDC:
NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2019 (Mar. 23, 2021), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/
100472; Births to Unmarried Women: Indicators on Children and Youth, supra note 142.
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Figure 2
Birth rates for women between ages 15 and 44 fluctuated (sometimes wildly)
between 1980 and 2007 and teen birth rates have declined precipitously (by
75%) since the 1990s.147 Pre-COVID fertility rates (the average number of
children women have over a lifetime) of 1.64 children/woman148 were already
lower than the “replacement fertility” rate (2.1 children/woman) demographers
believe is needed for strong and stable economic growth.149 Birthrates, which
typically drop during recessions, declined after the 2007 Great Recession150 and
the COVID-19 pandemic “baby bust” may have resulted in up to 60,000 fewer
children.151

147

See Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 5–6.
Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip Levine, Will Births in the US Rebound? Probably Not., BROOKINGS INST.
(May 24, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/24/will-births-in-the-us-rebound-probablynot/; see generally Martin et al., supra note 146 (documenting 5-year decline in general fertility rate); Laura D.
Lindberg et al., Early Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Findings from the 2020 Guttmacher Survey of
Reproductive Health Experiences, GUTTMACHER INST. 4, 10 (June 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/
early-impacts-covid-19-pandemic-findings-2020-guttmacher-survey-reproductive-health.
149
See Kearney & Levine, supra note 148; Lindberg et al., supra note 148.
150
See Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 17.
151
Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 17; Eliana Dockterman, Women Are Deciding Not to Have Babies
Because of the Pandemic. That’s Bad for All of Us, TIME (Oct. 15, 2020), https://time.com/5892749/covid-19baby-bust/; Lindberg et al., supra note 148; see Anna Brown, Growing Share of Childless Adults in U.S. Don’t
Expect to Ever Have Children, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/
11/19/growing-share-of-childless-adults-in-u-s-dont-expect-to-ever-have-children/; Melissa S. Kearney &
Phillip Levine, The Coming COVID-19 Baby Bust is Here, BROOKINGS INST. (May 5, 2021), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/05/the-coming-covid-19-baby-bust-is-here/.
148
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The largest declines in birth rates have been for highly educated women,
women in their late 30s and early 40s, and women who were already mothers.152
In addition to not having children, women are delaying having children. Because
more women are attending college and choosing not to have children until they
are married, the median age for first-time mothers increased from 22.7 years in
1980 then to 26.9 years in 2018.153 Female college graduates constitute the
largest percentage of women giving birth over the age of 25 though they have
fewer children compared to non-college mothers.154
Women are deciding not to have children, are delaying having children, and
are having fewer children for both emotional and economic reasons. Just as
female college graduates realize they no longer need to be married to be viewed
as successful, women who value their work are less likely to sacrifice their
careers (or personal lives) to have children.155 Young adults generally find
parenthood less attractive because they understand the substantial amount of
time modern childrearing (now generally referred to as “parenting”) requires and
they have concluded that being a parent impinges on their leisure time and
personal freedom. 156 More recently, young adults report that they do not want
to have children for social or political reasons, including climate change or the
state of the world generally.157

152
Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip Levine, Early Evidence of Missing Births from the COVID-19 Baby Bust,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/early-evidence-of-missing-births-fromthe-covid-19-baby-bust/.
153
See Kearney & Levine, supra note 152; Sabrina Tavernise et al., supra note 145.
154
T.J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamilton, Educational Attainment of Mothers Aged 25 and Over: United
States, 2017, CDC: NAT’L. CTR. HEALTH STATS. 1, 4 (Feb. 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/
db332-h.pdf (explaining that “[t]he largest percentage of births by educational attainment was for mothers with
a Bachelor’s degree,” who made up 25% of mothers giving birth over the age of 25, but further stating that,
“[t]he lowest mean numbers of live births were for mothers with a Bachelor’s degree (1.87) and with an advanced
degree (1.80)”).
155
Sabrina Tavernise et al., supra note 145.
156
See Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 29–30.

Changing norms regarding the intensity of parenting might change people’s views toward how
many children to have or whether to have them at all. Such changes are particularly relevant in
an era where parents, including mothers, work longer hours outside the home, clashing with
career aspirations or a desire for more leisure time.
Id. (describing the second demographic transition as a shift that involves “a decoupling of marriage and
childbearing, a change in the relationship between education and childbearing, a rise in childlessness, and the
establishment of a two-child norm for those having children”).
157
Alex Williams, To Breed or Not to Breed? N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/20/style/breed-children-climate-change.html (noting that in summer of
2021, “Morgan Stanley analysts concluded that the ‘movement to not have children owing to fears over climate
change is growing and impacting fertility rates quicker than any preceding trend in the field of fertility decline’”).
But see Brown, supra note 161 (noting that “[a] majority (56%) of non-parents younger than 50 who say it’s
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The main reason women are delaying having children and fertility rates have
plunged is the same reason marriage rates are declining: young adults are no
longer convinced that becoming a parent is economically feasible.158 Recent
surveys and reports reveal that a key reason young adults are choosing not to
have children is they understand that children “come with associated costs,
broadly defined, including both time and money.”159 Birthrates are particularly
low in regions with higher-wage jobs, in part because higher-income collegeeducated women are opting to avoid the “earnings penalty” the labor market
imposes on working mothers.160 That is, despite anti-discrimination laws,
overall lifetime earnings for highly educated, higher-income mothers are lower
because some employers still pay mothers less based on their (illegal) view that
mothers are less committed to their jobs than men or single female workers.161
The juggling act parents, especially working single-mothers, performed
during the COVID pandemic exemplifies why young adults are avoiding
parenthood. Some couples feared having a child during the early months of the
pandemic because of concerns about giving birth in a hospital that might ban
family or spouses from the delivery room or that might expose the mother, baby
or family members to the coronavirus.162 In addition to health concerns about
giving birth to a child during a global health pandemic, the lives of virtually all
working parents were completely upended when daycare facilities and K-12
schools abruptly closed at the start of the pandemic.163

unlikely they will have children someday say they just don’t want to have kids,” but further explaining that
“[a]mong childless adults who say they have some other reason for thinking they won’t have kids in the future,
no single reason stands out” – though some provided examples included not wanting to have kids because of:
(1) medical reasons (19%); (2) financial reasons (17%); (3) partner’s age (10%); (4) state of the world (9%); and
(5) environmental concerns (5%)).
158
Sabrina Tavernise et al., supra note 145; see Martin et al., supra note 146; Kearney et al., supra note
56, at 6.
159
Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 6.
160
Sabrina Tavernise et al., supra note 145 (“The birthrate is falling fastest in places with the greatest job
growth—where women have more incentive to wait.”)
161
See Tavernise et al., supra note 145 (explaining that, today, employers “expect[] employees to be
available around the clock,” despite there being few “policies to help parents combine work and family”); Claire
Cain Miller, Americans are Having Fewer Babies. They Told Us Why., N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/07/05/upshot/americans-are-having-fewer-babies-they-told-us-why.html.
162
Lindberg et al., supra note 148; Christina Capatides & Caitlin O’Kane, Pregnant Women Are Being
Forced to Give Birth Alone as Hospitals Restrict Visitors During Coronavirus, CBS NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-pregnant-women-hospitals-give-birth-alone/.
163
Aliyya Swaby, Texas Day Cares are Closing Just When Some Parents Need Them More Than Ever,
TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/24/coronavirus-closes-texas-day-cares-some-parentsneed-them-more-ever/.
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Even when daycare centers and K-12 schools reopened, parents were never
sure if they could work (from home or in person) on any given day because of
the constant risk that a COVID outbreak would trigger a school closing.
Moreover, prolonged school and day care closures added to the anxiety and
stress young workers faced, particularly since many were unsure when
unemployment rates spiked during the 2020 COVID-19 recession if they would
keep their jobs.164 While most women are employed in the paid labor market,
employment rates remained lower for women in 2021 and many mothers
stopped working when they found they could not simultaneously handle
working (from home, or in person) and rearing their children.165
Young adults who are concerned that they may not find stable high-wage
jobs or who question whether they will be able to rear their children in a home
they own are rationally responding to those fears by delaying or avoiding having
children. Likewise, young adults who fear they will not be able to afford health
insurance or childcare, or whose jobs do not provide paid leave when their
children are born, are avoiding becoming parents.166 These fears and concerns
are well-founded, as a 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
calculated that a middle-income married-couple family will likely spend
between $12,350 and $13,900 each year (in 2015 dollars) on their child, or a
total of $233,610 from birth through age 17.167 Pre-COVID studies found that,
in almost half of the states in this country, one year of tuition at the public

164

See Dockterman, supra note 151.
Nicole Bateman & Martha Ross, Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially Harmful for Working Women?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19-been-especially-harmfulfor-working-women/ (observing that the pandemic “upended the labor market, with disastrous consequences for
working women and their families”); Misty L. Heggeness et al., Tracking Job Losses for Mothers of School-Age
Children During a Health Crisis, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/
2021/03/moms-work-and-the-pandemic.html#:~:text=Tracking%20Job%20Losses%20for%20Mothers,Children%20
During%20a%20Health%20Crisis&text=Around%2010%20million%20U.S.%20mothers,new%20U.S.%20Ce
nsus%20Bureau%20data (finding that “[w]orking mothers are either willingly leaving jobs or are being forced
out in extraordinary numbers” during the COVID pandemic and observing that these “employment patterns are
becoming prolonged and more severe.”). When childcare centers and K-12 schools closed, employment rates
dropped by almost 10 percentage points (from 76.1% in September 2019 to 67.4% one year later) for unpartnered
mothers. Amanda Barroso & Rakesh Kochhar, In the Pandemic, the Share of Unpartnered Moms at Work Fell
More Sharply Than Among Other Parents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/11/24/in-the-pandemic-the-share-of-unpartnered-moms-at-work-fell-more-sharply-than-amongother-parents/. Because Black and Latino mothers are more likely to be unpartnered, they had the greatest
employment declines during the pandemic. Id.
166
Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 13–14 (noting that “birth rates decrease for renters when housing prices
increase” but that birth rates are lower in high-income cities).
167
Mark Lino et al., Expenditures on Children by Families, 2015, USDA 10, 19 (Jan. 2017, revised Mar.
2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/10700/blog-files/USDA_Expenditures%20on%20children%20by%20family.
pdf?t=1520090048492.
165
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university cost less than full-time preschool.168 As evidenced by the childcare
crisis during the COVID pandemic, childcare remains unaffordable and costs
exceed more than 7% of household income for over 80 percent of families.169
Ironically, one reason this country is facing a childcare crisis is because of
the disintegration of the “traditional” American household. Young working
parents cannot always find kin to provide free childcare, particularly if they do
not live near extended family. But with more mothers earning wages in the paid
labor market and fewer women marrying the fathers of their children, there are
fewer stay-at-home mothers available to care for their children. Though the
number of grandparents who both work in the paid labor market and take care
of their grandchildren has increased since the 1970s and some older workers quit
their jobs or retired during COVID to provide childcare for their
grandchildren,170 decades of wage stagnation make it financially impracticable
for some grandparents to stop working and provide unpaid care for their
grandchildren.171
D. More Dual-Earning Households
While state and federal laws continue to favor the “traditional” household,
dual-income married couples now outnumber the number of traditional husbandat-work/wife-at-home households. Most married couples (particularly if they
have children) simply cannot afford the luxury of having a stay-at-home spouse.
In 1920, only 24% of women worked outside the home and this share roughly

168
See The US and the High Price of Child Care: An Examination of a Broken System, CHILD CARE
AWARE AM., https://www.childcareaware.org/our-issues/research/the-us-and-the-high-price-of-child-care-2019/;
Parents and the High Cost of Child Care, CHILD CARE AWARE AM. at 20 (2017), https://www.childcareaware.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017_CCA_High_Cost_Report_FINAL.pdf.
169
Cf. Julie Yixia Cai & Algernon Augstin, Family Policies in the Build Back Better Act Would Reduce
Burdens on Families and Provide a Better Buffer to Economic Instability, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH.
(Dec. 14, 2021), https://cepr.net/family-policies-in-the-build-back-better-act-would-reduce-burdens-on-families-andprovide-a-better-buffer-to-economic-instability/.
170
Id.; Leanne Italie, Working Families Enlist Grandparents to Help With the Kids, PBS: NEWS HOUR
(Aug. 20, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/working-families-enlist-grandparents-tohelp-with-the-kids.
171
See Brooks, supra note 36.

Affluent conservatives often pat themselves on the back for having stable nuclear families. They
preach that everybody else should build stable families too. But then they ignore one of the main
reasons their own families are stable: They can afford to purchase the support that extended
family used to provide—and that the people they preach at, further down the income scale,
cannot.
Id.
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doubled by 1970.172 While approximately 12% of married mothers with young
children earned wages in the labor force in the 1960s, that number increased to
almost 73% by 2000.173 Most married women, including mothers, now earn
wages in the labor force.174 By 2019, 70% of married mothers earned income in
the paid labor market and, by 2021, 63% of children ages 5 and under lived in
households where their parents work.175 Although, as noted earlier, Black wives
have typically worked in the paid labor market, since the 1970s lower- and
middle-income white wives have also been forced to leave their traditional
households to earn income.176
Though employment rates and overall income is higher for white males than
Black males, white families have seen the most dramatic increase in the number
of women who work outside the home largely because declining male wages
(particularly for non-college males) made it impossible for their families to
maintain their lifestyle based solely on their husband’s stagnant or declining
income. Thus, while 65% of white children lived in households with a stay-athome mother in 1969, by 2014 only 51% of white children lived in dual-parent
but single-income households.177
IV. RESTORING “TRADITIONAL” HOUSEHOLDS AND CREATING NEW
TRADITIONS
Laws and norms that encourage Americans to live in a “traditional”
household have failed to convince young adults to make what they perceive to
be unaffordable marital, childbearing, and home buying decisions. Even if
marriage provides the most stable economic (and potentially emotional)
environment for young adults and children, young adults no longer feel they
must marry and have children to lead a fulfilling life. Stagnant income and job
instability make it nearly impossible for most people, particularly if they are

172
U.S. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 157 (2015), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2015/pdf/ERP-2015-chapter4.pdf.
173
Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1980); Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (2010), https://www.
bls.gov/cps/wlf-intro-2010.htm.
174
Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, U.S BUREAU LAB. STATS. 1 (Apr. 2021), https://www.bls.gov/
opub/reports/womens-databook/2020/pdf/home.pdf.
175
Id.; National and State Child Cate Data Overview, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 15, 2021), https://
bipartisanpolicy.org/report/national-child-care/.
176
See Boushey & Vaghul, supra note 74.
177
See D’Vera Cohn et al., After Decades of Decline, A Rise in Stay-at-Home Mothers, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Apr 8, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2014/04/08/after-decades-of-decline-a-rise-in-stayat-home-mothers/.
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non-white and non-college, to live in a husband-at-work and wife-at-homeraising-children “traditional” household. Notwithstanding laws and policies that
are designed to encourage people to live in traditional households, most young
adults simply cannot find stable jobs that pay them enough to marry, have
children, buy homes, and form their own households.
Federal and state laws and assistance programs that encourage and subsidize
the status of being married are no longer defensible now that the personal
lifestyle choice to rear children in a “traditional” household is one that only the
most economically privileged members of society can afford to make. Given the
financial vulnerabilities lower- and middle-income families are facing, state and
federal laws should neither encourage nor subsidize “traditional households”
and should instead award financial benefits on a household-neutral basis that
considers whether members of the household provide the type of “care, services,
and mutual help” that traditional households historically provided for spouses
and minor children.178 Specifically, laws and policies should focus on how
households function not whether the residents are married, cohabitants or a
single mother and children.179
Tax scholars have argued, since at least the early 1980s, that there is no tax
justification for encouraging or subsidizing marriage because a taxpayer’s
marital status is “irrelevant in determining what portion of the federal tax burden
the individual should bear.”180 These scholars argue that all taxpayers should be
required “to file a separate return under a single rate schedule and to report on
that return only his or her income”181 because the choice to marry “should be
viewed like other personal consumption choices that have no effect on the
individual’s income tax burden, such as purchasing a Mercedes instead of a
motorcycle.”182
Social security laws also should not award benefits simply because the
retiree was married to someone who earned income in the paid labor market.
178

See West, supra note 16, at 189.
See id. at 186 (arguing that same-sex couples should receive the same “federally bestowed benefits”
that accrued at that time only to heterosexually married couples and arguing that the only issue should be whether
the family is “defined by long-term commitment and the dedication to raising and caring for children.”); see also
Baker, supra note 14, at 208 (arguing that child support formulas that “are based on estimations of the average
amount of money a normative two-parent family would spend on a child if the two parents lived together” harm
people who rear children outside of a marriage by assigning responsibilities “as if they were living in a maritallike relationship”).
180
Gann, supra note 173, at 6.
181
Gann, supra note 173.
182
Id.; see also Brown, supra note 34, at 59–61. See generally Aloni, supra note 33, at 3 (discussing
theories for marriage neutrality).
179
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Most Americans (unless they are rich) who are nearing retirement do not have
private retirement savings and likely will not receive income from an employerprovided retirement plan.183 Specifically, half of older households (age 55 or
older) lack private retirement savings from an IRA or 401(k) plan and few
participated in an employer-provided defined benefit plan or have other nonretirement savings they can use when they stop earning income.184 Because
federal social security benefits provide most of the income for roughly half of
households age 65 or older, these benefits should be awarded based solely on
financial need, not on the recipient’s current or former marital status.185
Awarding enhanced social security benefits based on a recipient’s marital
status may have been justified when most households consisted of husbands who
earned wages in the labor market and wives who reared children but either did
not or could not earn wages outside the home. But, as noted earlier, most wives
now earn wages in the labor market and unmarried women (particularly if they
are single Black mothers) are expected to work outside the home to qualify for
government assistance. Because fewer wives are stay-at-home spouses and
marriage rates are highest for upper-income, white college graduates, awarding
federal assistance based on marital status harms lower- and middle-income
adults (the least likely to be married) even though they have the greatest financial
need for retirement income when they stop working.
Given the shrinking number of traditional households and the looming
retirement savings crisis in this country, calculating retirement income based on
marital status rather than financial need exacerbates economic disparity gaps
among older Americans. Indeed, providing retirement income subsidies for
people who live in traditional households reinforces and amplifies “the
preexisting power and wealth inequalities that serve as the foundation” of
marital wealth and income gaps.186 Because the occupants of traditional
households are disproportionately white, higher-income college graduates,

183
NAN MOONEY, (NOT) KEEPING UP WITH OUR PARENTS: THE DECLINE OF THE PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE
CLASS 134 (2008).
184
See Retirement Security: Most Households Approaching Retirement Have Low Savings at 1, GAO
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-442r.pdf. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note
127 (finding that social security was the most common source of retirement income but noting that 8 in 10
retirees received some income from a pension, interest, dividend, rental income, or wages)
185
Id. Likewise, the tax treatment for IRAs is more favorable for married taxpayers and distribution
requirement vary depending on whether the beneficiary is the account holder’s spouse. See Cassidy J. Seamon,
Killing the Security Blanket Goodbye: How the Secure Act will Affect IRA Beneficiaries’ Long-term Financial
Security, 62 B.C. L. REV. 357, 372–373 (2021).
186
Aloni, supra note 33, at 3.
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marriage subsidies and the laws and policies that favor the traditional household
exacerbate inequality (particularly racial) gaps.187
While benefits generally should not be awarded based on marital status, if
state and federal policymakers continue to believe that “traditional” households
provide value and benefits to society, they should make it easier for lower- and
middle-income young adults to marry, have children, and buy their own homes.
For example, as discussed earlier, some financially unstable non-college adults
are viewed as unmarriageable. If we truly value traditional households,
educational institutions must find ways to encourage lower-income youth
(particularly males) to graduate from high school and attend college, and they
must make college more affordable to ensure that young adults are not saddled
with onerous student loan debt that may deem them unmarriageable.188
Likewise, states and the federal government must develop additional postsecondary training programs and apprenticeships to help workers find higherwage jobs that do not require a bachelor’s degree.
To reduce high incarceration rates for lower-income (particularly non-white)
males, legislators should continue to reduce penalties for people arrested and
charged with low level drug offenses. Similarly, to address high Black male
unemployment, businesses should be prohibited from demanding that job
applicants disclose their arrest or conviction records unless the business has
conditionally offered the applicant a job. Likewise, the business should be
prohibited from refusing to hire an applicant based on their criminal history
unless the applicant’s arrest or conviction background disqualifies the worker
from holding the job.189
The COVID childcare crisis is a glaring display of the government’s failure
to adopt policies that would help increase the number of traditional households.
If we truly value traditional households, local, state, and federal governments
must enact more “pro-natalist” policies, like the Build Back Better plan, that
provide subsidized childcare, paid parental leave, and child tax credits.190 Until
187

See Aloni, supra note 33, at 3.
Women, Blacks, and younger adults are most likely to have student loan debt. Michael D. King et al.,
COVID-19 Adds to Economic Hardship of Those Most Likely to Have Student Loans, LAKE CNTY. NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.lakeconews.com/news/70049-covid-19-adds-to-economic-hardship-of-those-mostlikely-to-have-student-loans.
189
See generally Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and
Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1878–79 (2015) (discussing challenge workers with felony
convictions face when searching for jobs).
190
See generally Kearney et al., supra note 56, at 35 (“The evidence about pronatalist policies that have
been implemented and evaluated in the United States and in other high-income countries suggests that these
types of policies lead to modest increases in birth rates in the short-term, but are unlikely to lead to sustained
188

DICKERSON_PROOF_5.18.22

222

5/18/2022 1:26 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

politicians enact policies that make childcare more affordable and make it
possible for young adults to take paid leave to care for their sick children, even
young adults who are willing to bring children into a politically turbulent world
facing severe global warming will rationally avoid having children.
Finally, if traditional households are deemed beneficial to society, local,
state, and government leaders must tackle the affordable housing crisis.191 While
housing unaffordability affects more than just young potential home buyers,
there will continue to be fewer traditional households if the only young adults
who can afford to buy homes are rich or have wealthy relatives who can
subsidize their home buying expenses. Localities can make it easier for young
adults to establish their own households by removing “exclusionary” zoning
laws that increase the price of housing (both to rent and to purchase) and that
decrease the supply of small starter homes that would appeal and be affordable
to young adults.
Generally, exclusionary zoning policies increase housing prices by: (1)
imposing large minimum lot or floor sizes for single-family homes; (2)
excluding multi-family housing from certain neighborhoods; (3) imposing
massive minimum lot sizes (or minimum living space requirements) for multifamily housing buildings; and (4) preventing existing owners from building a
smaller, additional rental unit on their property or in their homes by, for example,
building a garage apartment unit.192 If we truly value traditional households, we
must find ways to make it possible for young adults to establish these
households.
CONCLUSION
While public policies should neither encourage nor subsidize a lifestyle
choice to live in a “traditional” household, the inability of most young adults to
live in that type of household is alarming and potentially catastrophic for their
long-term financial stability and the long-term stability of the U.S. economy.
Young adults of all races are delaying marriage and childrearing or are choosing
to rear children in unpartnered or cohabitating households because they realize
that it may be economically infeasible for them to marry and have children.
Rather than continuing to reward the largely homogeneous and demographically
higher birth rates.”).
191
See, e.g., Vespa, supra note 84, at 3.
192
See David Schleicher, Exclusionary Zoning’s Confused Defenders, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1317
(2021) (noting that “excessive land use regulations result in high housing costs, causing huge rent burdens,
homelessness, and economic inequality through capital appreciation for homeowners.”)
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shrinking “traditional” household, the government should focus on stabilizing
young, financially fragile households and should ignore whether those
households consist of married couples with one or two-earners, single-parents,
or childless households.

